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INTRODUCTION

By conservative estimates, more than one million women have received silicone gel-filled breast implants.' Highly publicized hearings by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) challenging the
safety of implants2, recent restrictions on the use of silicone gel-filled
1. The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that between
300,000 and one million women in the United States have breast implants. Laurie
Jones, FDA: Use Saline Implants or Enroll Patients in Silicone Trials, 35 AM. MED. NEWS,
May 4, 1992, at 2. Cf Teich v. Food & Drug Admin., 751 F. Supp. 243, 245-46
(D.D.C. 1990) (estimating the number of silicone implant recipients at as high as two
million). The Food and Drug Administration estimates that only 15% of these implants were undertaken for reconstructive purposes, while the other 85% were done
for cosmetic reasons. Id.
2. The FDA initiated hearings about the safety of breast implants in the fall of
1991. In January 1992, the agency declared a moratorium on the manufacture, shipping, and use of silicone implants. Jones, supra note 1, at 3.
Although breast implants were first used more than 30 years ago, the FDA was
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implants3, and several multi-million dollar verdicts in breast implant
actions 4 have provoked a rush to the courthouse.5 Prior to this onslaught, some litigation concerning the product had been filed in the
6
federal courts.
Plaintiffs seeking recovery from breast implant manufacturers typically raise issues of breach of express and implied warranties, neglinot responsible for testing and approval because the product was developed before
Congress amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to include medical devices. See
21 C.F.R. § 803 (1992).
When the FDA became responsible for medical devices in 1976, more than 960
types of high or medium risk machines or implants were being used in humans.
Although the agency established safety and efficacy standards for new devices, it
"grandfathered in" breast implants and other medical devices already on the market.
Steven Finch, Beyond Implants: What Else Haven't They Checked Out?, HEALTH,July-Aug.
1992, at 74.
3. On April 16, 1992, the FDA limited access to silicone gel-filled breast implants. Silicone implants will continue to be available to women who require reconstruction following mastectomy or correction of a malformation. Women who desire
breast implants for breast enlargement may have them inserted only under the auspices of a controlled clinical study. Update on Silicone Gel-Filled Breast Implants,
FDA Letter, May 27, 1992. As of this writing, only one manufacturer, Mentor Corporation, has received FDA approval to begin clinical studies. Id.
4. E.g., Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543, 1550, 1553 (M.D. Ala. 1991)
(finding breast implant manufacturer liable for $5.4 million; judgment subsequently
reduced by remittitur to $2.3 million); Livshits v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, No.
87-C2403, 1991 WL 261770, at *8, *11 (S.D.N.Y. November 27, 1991) (finding
breast implant manufacturer liable for $1.5 million; lost wages and past pain and
suffering awards set aside pending new trial); Hopkins v. Dow Corning, No. C-884703TEH (N.D. Calif., December 13, 1991) (finding breast implant manufacturer liable for $7.3 million). In December 1992, a Texas court awarded a record $25 million
to a silicone breast implant recipient including $20 million in punitive damages, finding that the company had engaged in false or deceptive acts. Amy Singer, Look Over
Here, AM. LAw., Mar. 1993, at 87.
5. As of September 13, 1993, 10,000 to 12,000 breast implant claims were
pending in U.S. courts. 19 The Gray Sheet (FDC Reports, Inc.), Sept. 13, 1993, at 1.
6. See, e.g., Knapp v. Dow Corning Corp., 941 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1991); Klein
v. Dow Corning Corp., 661 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1981); Toole v. McClintock, 778 F.
Supp. 1543 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D.
Md. 1989), afl'd, 898 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1990); Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712
F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989).
The number of implant actions increased dramatically late in 1991 when Dow
Corning Corporation, under order to comply with discovery, disclosed dozens of internal documents that previously were under court seal. These documents revealed
that, as early as 1971, Dow possessed information that fluid and gel from breast implants could leak causing damage to surrounding tissue and that gel migrating from
the breast could produce serious medical complications. Daniel Wise, Bar Besieged
with Queries on Breast Implant Claims, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1992, at 1, 2.
As of September 13, 1993, Dow Corning was defending more than 6800 breast
implant actions. Dick Lehr, $4. 75 Billion Accord Eyed on Breast Implants; Plaintiffs, .Mlanufacturers Agree on Compensation Fund, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1993, at 1.
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gence, strict products liability, and failure to warn. 7 Among the
issues that have barred recovery in breast implant cases is whether
breast implant manufacturers owe a duty to warn patients directly or
whether the manufacturer's duty is discharged by warning the physician or "learned intermediary."8
Almost as soon as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first articulated the learned intermediary doctrine in 1966,9 courts began limiting its effect by exempting claims arising from specific medical
products.10 By some curious lapse in the court's increasingly narrow
application of the doctrine, breast implant actions eluded the judicial
scrutiny that had exempted strikingly similar medical product actions.II Moreover, the courts have inconsistently applied the doctrine, leaving both the victims of defective medical products and the
7.

See generally 2 MARDEN G. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.08[4], at 9-67

(1990).
8. See infra part III.A.
9. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
10. See discussion infra parts III.B-D.
11. The learned intermediary doctrine barred plaintiff recovery in early breast
implant actions. See, e.g., Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D.
Md. 1989), aftd, 898 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1990); Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712
F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (D. Conn. 1989); Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 226
Cal. Rptr. 299, 305 (Ct. App. 1986); Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 662 P.2d 646, 650-51
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983). See also discussion infra part IV.A.
A turning point in breast implant litigation occurred in Stern v. Dow Corning
Corp., No. C-83-2348-MMP (N.D. Cal. 1985), the first case that introduced evidence
suggesting the defendant not only knew that silicone gel migrated but also that there
was a relationship between silicone gel implants and autoimmune disease. Alison
Frankel, From Pioneers to Profits, AM. LAw., June 1992, at 84. Prior breast implant cases
involved judgments or settlements of $15,000 to $20,000. The Stern court, however,
awarded the plaintiff $211,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 85.
In the wake of Stern, plaintiffs in breast implant actions against Dow Corning
generally are not barred by the learned intermediary doctrine and may prevail on the
grounds that the manufacturer failed to adequately warn the physician. Increasingly,
juries are finding that the manufacturers acted with wanton disregard for breast implant recipients and are making large punitive damage awards. See Singer, supra note

4.
On September 9, 1993, Dow Corning announced a proposed $4.75 billion settlement that would compensate eligible silicone gel-filled breast implant recipients
during a 30-year period. Gina Kolata, Fund Proposedfor Settling Suits Over Breast Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at 16. A plaintiff who is not satisfied with her
settlement can reject it and sue for compensation and damages. Id.
Prior to exiting the breast implant industry, Dow Corning maintained only a
35% market share in the U.S. and a 40% market share worldwide. Telephone Interview with Ron Actis, Manager of External Communications, Dow Corning Corp.
(April 21, 1993). It is likely, therefore, that the learned intermediary doctrine, as
presently interpreted, will continue to play a role in breast implant actions against
other manufacturers, as well as against manufacturers of other elective drugs and
devices that similarly are promoted directly to consumers. See discussion infra part V.
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products' manufacturers vulnerable in an inefficient and unpredictable tort liability system.' 2
This Comment examines judicial rulings that cast doubt on the
continued vitality of the learned intermediary doctrine. Further, it
suggests that, based on the rationale that the courts used to carve
out exceptions for vaccines,' 3 oral contraceptives,14 and intrauterine
devices (IUDs),t5 the learned intermediary doctrine is inapplicable to
breast implant cases. This Comment encourages consideration of a
new exception that would apply where manufacturers of elective
drugs or devices promote their products directly to consumers and
the consumer subsequently decides to use the drug or device without
significant physician input.16 Finally, this Comment examines
changes in regulation and litigation since the creation of the learned
intermediary defense and concludes that, wherever possible, the law
should require that manufacturers of drugs and devices warn the patient directly. 17
II.

STRICT LIABILITY AND MEDICAL PRODUCTS

Generally, the manufacturer of a defective product that is unreasonably dangerous is liable for any harm caused by the product regardless of whether the manufacturer acted with negligence.18 A
product can be defective due to an imperfect design, a flaw that was
present at the time the defendant sold the product, or the manufac12. Compare Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that

manufacturer of IUD device owes duty to directly warn patients of inherent dangers)
with Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 979 (Wash. 1978) (holding that,
under the learned doctrine, manufacturer of IUD owes no duty to directly warn patients of inherent dangers).
13. See discussion infra part III.B.

14.
15.
16.
17.

See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra part
infra part
infra part
infra part

III.C.
III.D.
V.
VI.

18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A states the law of strict liability as
follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated (above] applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965).
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turer's failure to adequately warn of risks inherent in the product.19
Tort law recognizes, however, that some hazardous products offer
social benefit or utility that outweighs their inherent dangers. 2O
Comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A, relieves the manufacturers of these "unavoidably unsafe" products
from strict liability for any injury resulting from their use if the products are properly manufactured and accompanied by adequate directions and warnings of the product's inherent dangers.21
Accordingly, the manufacturer of any product it knows or should
know is dangerous is held to an unequivocal duty to warn the consumer of its inherent or potential hazards and adverse effects.
Prescription drugs and devices are principal examples of unavoidably unsafe products. 22 Thus, one would expect that a duty to warn
the patient would arise on the part of the drug or device manufacturer. Indeed, warnings are routinely provided to consumers of nonprescription, over-the-counter drugs. 23 The courts, however, have
created an exception for the manufacturers of prescription drugs and
devices, limiting the duty to warn not to the foreseeable user of the
product or patient, but rather to the prescribing physician who acts
as a "learned intermediary."24
19. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that "[in strict liability ... the product must be
defective in the kind of way that subjects persons or tangible property to an unreasonable risk of harm.").
20.

The RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS defines "unavoidably unsafe" prod-

ucts as follows:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since
the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
21. Id. The exception does not apply to products that contain a manufacturing
flaw or an inadequate warning but only where the plaintiff alleges a design defect. See
also Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 305-09 (Idaho 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
942 (1988); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 925 (Kan. 1990).
22. See supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., Torsiello v. Whitehall Lab., 398 A.2d 132, 139-40 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979) (finding liability for failure to warn of risk of gastrointestinal hemorrhaging where plaintiff took eight Anacin tablets daily for relief of arthritis pain).
24. See generally Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and
Patient Information, 30 ST. Louis U. LJ. 633 (1986).
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Development and Early Cases

Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer of prescription or ethical 25 drugs is exculpated from what would otherwise
be a breach of the duty to warn. This exception applies only where
adequate information about a drug's related effects is furnished by
the manufacturer to prescribing physicians. 26
The learned intermediary doctrine was originally conceived in the
case of Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 7 Marcus involved a
young child whose death resulted from an overdose of suppositories
administered as prescribed by a physician. 28 The only product information supplied by the manufacturer was through advertisements in
medical journals. These advertisements failed to include information on the proper dosage for infants.29 The Marcus court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that a drug manufacturer
could not be found negligent for failure to warn the ultimate consumer of a product that was available only by a physician's
prescription.30
The California Court of Appeals maintained this pos.ition in Love v.
25. "Ethical drugs" are medications that, by statute, can be dispensed only by a
physician or with a physician's prescription, as distinguished from those which may
be sold over the counter. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1988).
26. See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974). The Reyes court explained the prescription drug manufacturer's duty as
follows:
[W]here prescription drugs are concerned, the manufacturer's duty to
warn is limited to an obligation to advise the prescribing physician of any
potential dangers that may result from the drug's use.... Prescription drugs
are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect.
As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is
the task of weighing the benefits of any medications against its potential
dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.
Id. See also Mauldin v. Upjohn Co., 697 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
848 (1983) (holding that the manufacturer of antibiotics was not required to warn
patient directly where physician was adequately warned); Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 577
P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ariz. 1978) (holding that manufacturer of anorexiant pharmaceutical was under duty to warn the physician only); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24
(Okla. 1982) (holding that IUD manufacturer was required to warn physician only);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 19, § 96, at 688.
27. 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1948).
28. Id. at 509.
29. Id.
30. The Marcus court noted that "[t]here is no reason to believe that a physician
would care to disregard his own knowledge of the effects of drugs and hence of the
quantity to be administered, and substitute for his own judgment that of a drug manufacturer." Id. at 510.
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Wolf,31 where it held that the manufacturer of an antibiotic medica-

tion had no duty to warn the patient directly.32 Rather, the court
concluded, its common law duty to warn could be satisfied by providing adequate warning to either the physician or the patient. 33 This
judicial reluctance to impose on manufacturers a direct duty to warn
the patient ultimately evolved into the learned intermediary
doctrine.
The term "learned intermediary" was first coined by Judge McManus writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Cornish,34 to describe the physician as a liaison between
patient and drug manufacturer. The Cornish court, in considering
whether the drug manufacturer had a duty to warn of newly-discovered side effects of an anti-arthritis medication, unequivocally held
that the drug manufacturer did have a duty to warn the prescribing
physician.35
Although the court's consideration of the learned intermediary
rule comprised only one paragraph of its opinion, the phrase set a
commanding precedent for subsequent rulings that a drug manufacturer had a duty to warn only the physician. From this relatively inauspicious inception, the doctrine of the learned intermediary
emerged as an accepted tort principle that has been invoked either
directly or indirectly in nearly every case where a plaintiff brought a
warning-related action against a prescription drug manufacturer.36
31. 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1964).
32. Id. at 193.
33. Id. The court wrote:
In the case of a drug it has been held there is a duty to exercise reasonable
care to warn of potential dangers from use even though the percentage of
users who will be injured is not large. But if adequate warning of potential
dangers of a drug has been given to doctors, there is no duty by .the drug
manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the doctor's patient for
whom the drug is prescribed.
Id. (citations omitted).
34. 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 85. The court described the patient-physician relationship as follows:
[W]e are dealing with a prescription drug rather than a normal consumer item. In such a case the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary
between the purchaser and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly
warned of the possibility of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of
the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect, there is an excellent
chance that injury to the patient can be avoided. This is particularly true if
the injury takes place slowly ....
Id.
36. See, e.g., Anderson v. McNeilab, Inc., 831 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying Louisiana law) (Zomax); Beyette v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 823 F.2d 990, 992 (6th
Cir. 1987) (applying Michigan Law) (IUD); Kirsch v. Picker Int'l Inc., 753 F.2d 670,
671 (8th Cir.), reh g denied en banc, 760 F.2d 183 (1985) (applying Missouri law) (radiation therapy); Stanback v. Parke Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Virginia law) (influenza vaccine); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d
652, 656 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying New Hampshire law) (oral contraceptives); Timm
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The doctrine was significantly broadened in Buckner v. Allergan
Pharmaceuticals,Inc. ,37 when Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeals
ruled that the manufacturer has no duty to warn the patient even
where the manufacturer is aware that the medical community is not
warning the patient of known adverse effects associated with the use
of a drug.38 In dismissing the claim against the manufacturer, the

court reasoned that because "physicians do not have an absolute
duty to inform patients of all possible side effects in every instance,
failure to do so in a particular instance should not give rise to a duty
in the manufacturer."39

The modern rule states that the ethical drug manufacturer has a
duty to adequately warn only the physician of the risks associated
with the use of a prescription drug. This rule has been interpreted
to encompass all physicians who may be involved with the patient in
a "decision-making capacity."40 A warning to the physician is adequate if it clearly discloses any risks or contraindications the manufacturer knows or should know are associated with the use of the
drug.4 1 The duty to warn is continuous, and the manufacturer is obv. Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Louisiana law) (antibiotic
cleocin), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345
(5th Cir. 1977) (applying Florida law) (oral polio vaccine); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying Pennsylvania law) (chloroquine
phosphate); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (applying
Connecticut law) (chloroquine); Fellows v. USV Pharm. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 299
(D. Md. 1980) (doriden); Goodson v. Searle Lab., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.
Conn. 1978) (oral contraceptives); Dunkin v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123
(W.D. Tenn. 1977) (oral contraceptives); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.
Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975), afd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (oral
contraceptives).
37. 400 So. 2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
1981).
38. Id. at 823-24.
39. Id. at 824.
40. McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974). In McEwen,
the court reasoned that, "[i]f the prescribing physician is entitled to make an informed choice in deciding whether the patient should begin taking a prescription
drug, it follows that a treating physician should have the same information in making
his decision as to whether the patient should stop taking that drug." Id. Cf Lindsay
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the manufacturer owes a duty only to adequately warn the plaintiff's physician).
41. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975),
affid, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). There is split authority as to whether the adequacy of the warning is a question of fact to be determined at trial or whether it is a
question of law. Compare Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (upholding decision that the adequacy of warnings is a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court) with Pierluisi v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 440 F. Supp.
691, 694 (D.P.R. 1977) (finding warning by manufacturer sufficient as a matter of law
if it is "sufficient to appraise [sic] a general practitioner as well as the 'unusually
sophisticated medical man' of the dangers of the drug") (citing Park Davis & Co. v.
Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1440 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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ligated to notify the medical profession of adverse effects subsequently discovered.42 Moreover, the ethical drug manufacturer is
directly liable to a patient for a breach of its duty to adequately warn
the physician.43
Although the learned intermediary doctrine initially was limited to
prescription drugs, it has since been extended to medical device
cases. 4 4 The Seventh Circuit, in Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Industries,45

rejected the plaintiff's argument that medical devices should be
treated differently from prescription drugs. Finding "no principled
basis" for a distinction between prescription drugs and prescription
devices, the court held that the learned intermediary exception has
equal application to those cases concerning medical devices.46
B.

Early Erosion of the Doctrine: The Vaccine Exception

Only two years after the Eighth Circuit first articulated the phrase
"learned intermediary,"47 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals carved
out the doctrine's first major exception.48 In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, the plaintiff contracted polio as a result of vaccination at a mass
immunization clinic.50 Although the manufacturer had supplied instructions and warnings to officials of the immunization program,
neither the manufacturer nor the physicians operating the clinic provided information about potential adverse effects to the actual administrators of the vaccine or to those who received the vaccine. 5'
Because the vaccine was administered to all who requested it with42. Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); accord Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767, 770 (W.D. Va. 1980); McEwen, 528 P.2d
at 528.
43. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1970);
McEwen, 528 P.2d at 529.
44. A medical device is defined as any instrument, implant, or other article recognized by the National Formulary or the United States Pharmacopeia and designed to
cure disease by affecting a patient's physical structure or bodily function without relying principally on some type of chemical action. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1988). Medical
devices, like prescription drugs, are obtainable only through the services of a physician. See also McPheron v. Searle Lab., Inc., 888 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding
manufacturer of IUD had no duty to warn consumer directly); Phelps v. Sherwood
Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding manufacturer of heart catheter
had no duty to warn patient directly); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227 (4th
Cir. 1984) (holding manufacturer of cardiac pacemaker fulfilled its duty by warning
physician).
45. 836 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987).
46. Id. at 303.
47. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
48. Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
49. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
50. Id. at 122.
51. Id. at 125.
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out any patient-by-patient assessment by a physician, the court found
the immunization process to be analogous to the sale of over-thecounter nonprescription drugs.52 The court ruled that, because of
the particular circumstances surrounding mass immunization programs, the learned intermediary doctrine was clearly inapplicable.
Thus the Ninth Circuit revitalized the common law duty to warn the
consumer directly.53

Six years later, the learned intermediary doctrine was again invalidated by the Fifth Circuit in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories.54 Like Davis,

the injured party in Reyes contracted polio after receiving the defendant's vaccine at a health clinic.55 Although the manufacturer provided an advisory warning to physicians, hospitals, and other
purchasers of the dangers associated with the vaccine, the consent
form signed by the patient's mother contained "no warning of any
5
sort." 6

The Reyes court acknowledged the learned intermediary rule 57 but
relied on Davis and imposed a duty to warn the consumer directly
when the manufacturer's product is "dispensed without the sort of
individualized medical balancing of the risks of the vaccinee that is
contemplated by the prescription drug exception."58
Subsequent cases have expanded the exception, finding the
learned intermediary doctrine inapplicable in immunization cases
even when the vaccine was given in a physician's office rather than in
a mass setting.59 The doctrine was further restricted in its application to immunizations until the determinative factor became
"whether the drug [was] commonly administered without individualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved and the individual's needs and circumstances." 60 It was only a matter of time
52. Id. at 131.
53. Id. at 130. Specifically, the Davis court said:
[A]lthough the (polio vaccine] was denominated as a prescription drug it
was not dispensed as such. It was dispensed to all comers ... (as in the case
of over-the-counter sales of nonprescription drugs) ....
Id. at 131.
54. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
55. Id. at 1270.
56. Id.

57. Id. at 1276.
58. Id. at 1276-77.
59. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
because vaccine was administered in clinic similar to the one in Reyes the manufacturer had duty to warn consumer directly). But see Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F.
Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (denying recovery for blindness attributed to mass
administration of measles-mumps-rubella vaccine because the Davis-Reyes-Givens line
of decisions narrowly apply to polio cases only).
60. Williams v. Lederle Lab., 591 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D. Ohio 1984). With the
enactment of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in 1986, a no-fault compen-
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before this test would be applied to prescription drugs outside the
class of immunizations.
C. Further Erosion: The Oral Contraceptive Exception
Almost two decades elapsed following the Davis court's initial narrowing of the learned intermediary doctrine before the next opportunity for erosion emerged. In the wake of FDA hearings on the use
and hazards of birth control pills, 6 1 several oral contraceptive users
filed suit for injuries associated with taking the pill.62 In the majority
of cases, courts applied the learned intermediary doctrine and found
no liability on the part of defendants where the manufacturers had
adequately warned the physician, either directly or indirectly. 63 At
issue in these cases was the adequacy of the warning given, not to
whom the warning was owed.64
In 1985, a body of case law developed that completely disregarded
the doctrine of the learned intermediary in the area of oral contraceptives and imposed a duty on the manufacturer to warn the ultimate consumer, the patient, directly.65
sation system, manufacturers no longer have a duty to directly warn consumers of
potential adverse effects from vaccines. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (1988).
61. In 1970, the FDA mandated that warnings about birth control pills be provided directly to patients, giving rise to the question of whether a private cause of
action accrues to the patient when such warnings are not given. See Hearings on Present
Status of Competition in the PharmaceuticalIndustry Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the

Senate Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6787 (1970). The court addressed
this question in Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis.
1981), and held that the FDA regulations created a duty to warn the patient. Id. at
965. Although the Lukaszewzicz ruling seems to introduce another exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine, the court merely relied on an alternative theory-violation of a federal regulation-for recovery. The Lukaszewicz court never addressed
the learned intermediary doctrine. Id.
62. E.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981); Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980); Skill v. Martinez, 91 F.R.D. 498
(D.NJ. 1981), aft'd, 677 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1982); Goodson v. Searle Lab., 471 F.
Supp. 546 (D. Conn. 1978); Dunkin v. Syntex Lab., 443 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tenn.
1977); Chambers v. G.D. Searles & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), afd, 567
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976);
Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214 (I11.App. Ct. 1979); Ortho Pharm. Corp.
v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Cobb v. Syntex Lab., 444 So. 2d
203 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 307 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1973).
63. See cases cited supra note 62. But see Lukaszewicz, 510 F. Supp. at 965 (holding
that manufacturer had a duty to warn patient directly but compliance with FDA regulations would satisfy such duty).
64. But see McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974) (recognizing the learned intermediary doctrine but extending the duty to warn to encompass treating physicians as well as prescribing physicians).
65. Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Ste-
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In MacDonald v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. ,66 the plaintiffs use of

oral contraceptives allegedly resulted in a stroke. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court abandoned the learned intermediary doctrine, contending that oral contraceptives usually are not taken out of medical
necessity; rather, oral contraceptives are drugs personally selected
by the patient from among other available birth control options. 6 7 A
prescription for oral contraceptives, therefore, is not the result of a
physician's skilled balancing of individual benefits and risks but
originates instead as a product of patient demand.68
At the same time that MacDonald was procee~ling through the Massachusetts court system, two similar actions were filed in the federal
district court of Michigan. In Odgers v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. ,69

the plaintiff received a prescription for oral contraceptives only after
examination by her physician and receipt of a warning pamphlet prepared by the manufacturer.70 The birth control pills allegedly
caused a blood clot that resulted in the plaintiffs partial paralysis.71
Following a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial and certified a question to the Michigan Supreme Court. 7 2 The central question was whether the
manufacturer had a duty to warn the patient directly.73 In a four to

three decision, the court declined to decide the question, 7 4 holding
that to judicially determine the scope of Ortho's duty to warn would
phens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
66. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
67. Id. at 69.
68. Id. The MacDonaldcourt also cited FDA regulations mandating patient labeling of oral contraceptives to support the imposition of a common law duty to warn.
Id. at 69-70 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 and 21 C.F.R. § 130.45 for the FDA's rationale for patient labeling). The FDA considered direct patient warnings necessary because use of oral contraceptives is "too complex to expect the patient to remember
everything told her by the physician," thus patients need information "in an organized comprehensive, understandable, and handy-for-future-reference form." 35 Fed.
Reg. 9002 (1970).
69. 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 868.
72. The defendant moved for a new trial arguing that the jury had been improperly instructed on the scope of Ortho's duty to warn. Specifically, the trial judge
instructed the jury that "Ortho owed [the plaintiff] the duty of reasonable care in the
preparation of the booklet accompanying the drug that, under federal regulations,
Ortho was required to distribute to physicians." In re Certified Questions, 358
N.W.2d 873, 873 (Mich. 1984).
73. Id.
74. The majority maintained that to render any decision on the issue of Ortho's
duty would require a choice between different systems for allocating between manufacturers, physicians, and pharmacists the duty to warn patients of the risks and potential side effects associated with the use of prescription drugs. Id. at 877. "[A]ny
decision of this Court implicates the obligations of members of professions who are
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be to assume a function best left to state legislative bodies. 7 5
Three dissenting justices, however, suffered no similar reluctance
in imposing a duty on Ortho to warn the users of oral contraceptives
directly.76 Focusing on the nontherapeutic purpose of oral contraceptives, the dissent noted the absence of any of the arguments commonly used to justify the learned intermediary exception to the
common law duty to warn. 7 7 The dissent distinguished oral contraceptive users from other prescription drug users, noting that the former generally do not rely on their physician's diagnostic and

treatment skills but decide independently to use the pill. 78
Moreover, the In re Certified Questions minority, like the MacDonald

court, noted that oral contraceptives are frequently prescribed for
extended periods of time without ongoing examination and evaluation by the physician. 79 Thus, the intended goal of the learned intermediary doctrine, reducing patient injuries through physician
monitoring,80 does not apply in the context of oral contraceptives. 8 '
The majority opinion in In re Certified Questions left the federal judge
in Odgers v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. without any definitive ruling on

an oral contraceptive manufacturer's duty to warn under Michigan
law.82

The Odgers court ultimately inferred from the Michigan

Supreme Court's reluctance to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to oral contraceptives that Ortho had a duty to warn the consumer directly where oral contraceptives are prescribed for
nontherapeutic purposes.8 3
The second Michigan federal case, Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co.,84
was decided after the ruling in In re Certified Questions but before
Odgers. The Stephens court relied heavily on the dissenting opinion of
In re Certified Questions to impose a duty to warn the consumer directly
involved in the distribution of prescription drugs but not represented in these proceedings." Id.
75. Specifically, the majority noted that "the allocation of the duty to warn patients is a public policy question involving the marketing system and economics of a
major industry and the everyday practice of an essential profession. We believe that
the Legislature is in a better position to allocate those duties." Id. at 874.
76. Id. at 886 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
77. In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 884-85 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. at 884. The dissent specifically stated that "[p]atient choice plays a much
more prominent role [in oral contraceptive use] than in the case of drugs prescribed
for the treatment of illness or injury. The role of patient choice in this process supports the need for a direct patient warning." Id.
79. Id. at 885.
80. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
81. In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d at 885.
82. Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
83. Id.
84. 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
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on the manufacturer when its product had been used solely for contraceptive purposes. 85
In all three cases, the learned intermediary doctrine was found inapplicable in the distribution of oral contraceptives, at least in cases
where oral contraceptives were used exclusively for nontherapeutic
purposes. Despite the colorable distinction between nontherapeutic
oral contraceptives and other prescription drugs, this exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine is not universally accepted.86
D.

The Last Challenge: The Intrauterine Device Exception

The Eighth Circuit, which first articulated the concept of the
learned intermediary, later delivered a significant blow to the doctrine by exempting IUDs. In Hill v. Searle Laboratories,87 the plaintiff

was implanted with a copper IUD (CU-7) after consultation and examination by her personal physician.88 Three years later, it was discovered that the device had penetrated her uterus, was embedded in
her small intestine, and required surgical removal. 89 In her action
against Searle Laboratories, the plaintiff alleged that the IUD was
manufactured and designed defectively and that the defendant had
failed to adequately warn her of the risk of perforation associated
with use of the device.90
The district court ruled that the CU-7 was a prescription drug falling within the ambit of comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

section 402A.91 The court noted that all prescription drugs fell
within the scope of comment k and were thus entitled to be insulated
from a strict liability claim.92 Moreover, the court held that, under
the learned intermediary doctrine, the drug manufacturer had a duty
to warn only the physician of its product's inherent dangers.93 Because Searle had provided Mrs. Hill's physician with adequate warnings, she was barred from recovery. 94
85. Id. at 381.
86. See, e.g., Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (applying the

learned intermediary doctrine in an action involving oral contraceptives despite the
fact that the pills were dispensed by a clinic worker, not a physician); see also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 n.9 (Mass.) (listing cases from 14 states
where the court applied the learned intermediary doctrine to the distribution of oral
contraceptives), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
87. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
88. Id. at 1065.
89. Id.

90. Hill v. Searle Lab., 686 F. Supp. 720, 721 (E.D. Ark. 1988), afd in part and
rev'd in part, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 725.
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 727.
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Judge Heaney, writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected the learned intermediary doctrine and reversed the district
court's decision. 95 In its interpretation of Arkansas products liability
law, the court of appeals predicted that, if faced with the issue of
determining the adequacy of warnings, the Arkansas Supreme Court
would adopt the test articulated in Reyes which requires "either a
warning . . .or an individualized medical judgment that this treat-

ment or medication is necessary and desirable.
...
"96 Consistent
with a literal reading of Reyes, the Eighth Circuit held that IUD patients failed to receive individual medical judgment on the appropriateness of the IUD and hence were entitled to direct warnings from
the manufacturer.97
Additional support for rejecting the learned intermediary doctrine
in IUD actions is found in the Eighth Circuit's determination that
IUDs were comparable to oral contraceptives.9 8 First, the court acknowledged that decisions about birth control generally were made
with minimal involvement of the physician.9 9 Second, the defendant
manufacturer marketed the IUD directly to consumers.' 0 0 Third,
there was no ongoing relationship between the physician and patient
after the IUD is inserted.'o' Finally, providing warnings directly to
the patient was feasible in light of FDA regulations requiring patient
package inserts.102 The court concluded that the patient makes the
final choice regarding IUD use and thus must be provided with direct
warnings to allow her to make a conscious and informed decision.1 0 3
Although the Hill court analogized IUDs to oral contraceptives
and relied on the reasoning of Odgers, Stephens, and McDonald to ex95. Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071.

The Eighth Circuit also rejected the lower court's

unqualified application of comment k to all prescription drug products. In dictum,
the court reasoned that comment k should be interpreted as an affirmative defense
and that its protection from strict liability for drug manufacturers required evidence
of exceptional social need for the product. Id. at 1068-70.
96. Virginia H. Castleberry, Hill v. Searle Laboratories: The Decline of the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine in Favor of Direct Patient Warnings of Drug Product Risks, 43 ARK. L.

821, 841-42 (1990) (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1295 (5th
Cir. 1974)).
Only three years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the Hill court's exemption of contraceptives from the learned intermediary doctrine. In West v. Searle
& Co., 806 S.W.2d 608 (Ark. 1991), the court applied the doctrine to oral contraceptives, reasoning that it was impossible for the manufacturer to warn the patient directly and that to do so would interfere with the physician-patient relationship. Id.
97. Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1989).
98. Castleberry, supra note 96, at 842.
99. Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. IUDs must be accompanied by appropriate patient labeling. 21 C.F.R.
§ 310.502(b)(2) (1992).
103. Castleberry, supra note 96, at 842.
REV.
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empt IUD-related injuries from the learned intermediary defense,
other courts have consistently held that these decisions should not
apply to cases involving IUDs.104

At the same time the Eighth Circuit was hearing Hill, the United
States District Court in Oregon was considering another case involving Searle's CU-7 IUD.105 In Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., the court distinguished Reyes on the grounds that IUD insertion required an
individualized medical judgment that did not exist in a mass immunization setting.106 Reasoning that, in the IUD context, the physician
performed a balancing of the benefits and risks of IUD use for the
patient before prescribing the device, the court held that the learned
intermediary doctrine applied with full force.07
In Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co. ,108 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled
that the oral contraceptive exception could not be applied to IUD
cases because, unlike oral contraceptives, IUDs must not only be prescribed by the physician but actually inserted by the physician.109

Courts confronted with IUD actions also have rejected the Hill
court's argument that the patient, not the physician, makes the final
choice on the use of an IUD. Most courts have found that the degree
of patient involvement may indeed be greater in the choice of contraceptives than in other prescription drugs but that the physician
makes the ultimate decision as to whether a particular contraceptive

requested by the patient is appropriate.110
Although Hill represents a minority view, it raises the question of
104. Most of these courts have concluded that IUDs are unavoidably unsafe products within the meaning of comment k, so the learned intermediary doctrine applies.
See, e.g., McPheron v. Searle Labs., Inc., 888 F.2d 31, 34 (5th Cir. 1989); Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1031-32 (D.NJ. 1988); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 1988 WL
67825 (Del. Super. June 22, 1988); Dupre v. G.D. Searle & Co., Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 11,426 (D.N.H. 1987); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 23-25 (Okla. 1982);
Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 977-79 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). But see
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1300-01 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that the question of whether a prescription medical device is an unavoidably unsafe product entitled to comment k protection is a question of fact for the jury).
105. Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989).
106. Id. at 1147-48.
107. Id. at 1148.
108. 567 A.2d 398 (Del. 1989).
109. The Lacy court stated:
The rationale supporting the learned intermediary doctrine is even stronger
when applied to the IUD, as opposed to an oral contraceptive, because not
only must the physician order the IUD for his patient, but the physician
must also fit the IUD in place. Thus, the patient is required to rely on her
physician's expertise whenever an IUD is used.
Id. at 401.
110. Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D.N.J. 1988); Terhune v. A.H. Robins
Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
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whether the Eighth Circuit opinion is an anomaly or whether it suggests expansion of a drug or device manufacturer's duty to warn patients directly. A comparison of the rationale behind the learned
intermediary defense and the reasoning on which each exception was
based is useful as a framework for evaluating the likelihood of further erosion of the learned intermediary doctrine as it applies to
breast implants as well as to other prescription drugs and devices.
E.

Unraveling the Doctrine's Intent
1.

Rationalefor the Learned Intermediary Doctrine

Commentators have justified the learned intermediary doctrine by
arguing that warnings directed to patients are "unnecessary, impractical and unwise.""' Further, Justice Wisdom effectively articulated
the doctrine's rationale in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories:
This special standard for prescription drugs is an understandable
exception to the Restatement's general rule that one who markets
goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in
his products . . . . Prescription drugs are likely to be complex
medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical
expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is
the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both
patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies then, who must
warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold
over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn
only the prescribing physician, who acts as a "learned intermediary" between manufacturer and consumer.' 12
Thus, the principal support for limiting a prescription drug manufacturer's duty to warn to physicians arises from the nature of the
patient-physician relationship. Individuals who seek medical care
place considerable trust in the skill and expertise of their physicians, 113 generally complying with the doctor's treatment plan without question.' 14 Therefore, supporters of the learned intermediary
defense consider direct warnings to the patient to be extraneous' 1 5
and the potential source of inappropriate interference with the physician-patient relationship.' 16
111. Gilhooley, supra note 24, at 642.
112. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974).
113. See Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Ohio 1981); Terhune,
577 P.2d at 978.
114. See Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 840; Terhune, 577 P.2d at 978.
115. See Gilhooley, supra note 24, at 643.
116. In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 883 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1993

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

A second justification for the doctrine stems from concern that direct warnings to patients may, in fact, actually endanger the patient's
health. According to this theory, some patients, confronted with information of a drug's adverse effects, may become intimidated by the
potential consequences or confused by the medical terminology and
forego treatment." 7 Fearing a confrontation with the prescribing
physician, the patient may avoid informing the physician and theoretically go for months, without receiving any therapy for an ailment
which otherwise could be treated virtually risk free." 8
Finally, the doctrine is frequently supported by the argument that
direct communication between the drug manufacturer and the patient is difficult-if not virtually impossible-because often the product is not distributed in its original packaging.'"9 This position is
based on the premise that, when the learned intermediary doctrine
was adopted, one-on-one contact between manufacturer and patient
was rare. Additionally, magazines and television had yet to assume
their function as disseminators of medical information.1 20
These rationales, however, are less important in understanding
the significance of the learned intermediary doctrine in medical
product liability actions than is the doctrine's principal purpose. As
set forth by the Cornish court, warnings must be provided to the physician who, if properly warned of potential side effects, can avoid in-

jury to the patient. 12 1

Soon after the doctrine's adoption, courts began to recognize and
to expand exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine, acknowledging that the doctrine should not be adopted if it fails to protector worse precipitates-patient injury.122
117. See Gilhooley, supra note 24, at 645. As one court noted, "[p]ackage inserts,
written for the physician, are detailed and technical, and may confuse and frighten
the patient." McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Wash.
1989) (en banc).
118. In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d at 882 (Boyle, J. dissenting) (citing
amicus brief of the Michigan Defense Trial Counsel).
119. See Gilhooley, supra note 24, at 643.
120. See Direct to Consumer Advertising of PrescriptionDrugs, AM. PHARM., Feb. 1984, at
20 (discussing the FDA's continued testing of direct to consumer advertising of prescription drugs); Advertising and Ethics: Prescription Drugs on TV?, Hosp. PRAC., Oct.
1983, at 13 (discussing the ethical implications of advertising prescription drugs on
television).
121. "If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect in some
patients, and is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect,
there is an excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided." Sterling Drug
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1967).
122. In re Certified Questions, 368 N.W.2d 873, 885 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting).
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Rationalefor the Exceptions

Although the vaccine exception arose in clinic settings, the crucial
factor to consider is not whether a large number of patients receive
treatment but whether the patient has had the opportunity to have
his or her needs individually evaluated before accepting treatment. 12 3 Where the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
the drug will be dispensed without individualized weighing of the
drug's benefits and patient's specific needs, the manufacturer retains
the duty to warn the patient. 124 Where little or no physician involvement in the decision-making process takes place, presumably, the rationale for directly warning the patient is to allow patients,
individually, to balance any benefits and risks concerning the
medication.
The courts' rationale for extending the duty to warn to patients
using oral contraceptives has been based on four factors.125 First,
oral contraceptives are used by healthy patients for personal convenience and not therapeutic purposes.126 Second, the use of contraceptives is attributed to patient demand rather than physician
advice. 127 Third, unlike the patient who uses a drug for therapeutic
reasons, the patient taking oral contraceptives frequently has no
ongoing relationship with the dispensing physician.128 Because the
patient uses the drug for extended periods of time without physician
involvement, she may not have adequate "opportunity to explore her
questions and concerns about the medication with the prescribing
physician."129 Finally, women who use oral contraceptives are exposed to substantial positive publicity generated by manufacturers
and targeted to potential consumers. These media campaigns influence the decision to use oral contraceptives more than physicians'
recommendations, thereby distinguishing the product from other
nonadvertised ethical drugs.30
The factors that rationalize exceptions to the learned intermediary
doctrine are evident in numerous physician-patient relationships.
The whole of these factors suggests that new inroads will continue to
limit the duty to warn to physicians only. It is peculiar, therefore,
123. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
124. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
125. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (citing In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 884 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting)).
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that the courts failed to recognize the opportunity for yet another
exception when breast implant cases began to be filed.
IV.
A.

BREAST IMPLANTS AND THE

DUTY

TO WARN

The Early Cases

Although breast implants have been used for more than thirty
years, actions for breast implant product liability were not reported
until 1978.13, Five years later, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
first cited the learned intermediary doctrine in a breast implant action. In Perfetti v. McGhan Medical,132 the plaintiff, a mastectomy pa-

tient, received a silicone gel-filled implant that subsequently
deflated. 133
Ms. Perfetti's claim was brought under the theories of strict products liability, breach of express and implied warranty, and failure to
adequately warn of the risk of deflation.134 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.135 On appeal, the defendant questioned
whether the duty to warn was owed to the plaintiff or to her surgeon.' 3 6 The court of appeals ruled that the manufacturer fulfilled
its duty by warning the physician. Further, the court stated that the
manufacturer need not additionally warn the patient, because "federal law restricted [breast implants] to sale by or on the order of a
licensed physician."'37 Although the Perfetti court was the first to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to breast implant actions, the
doctrine did not materially affect the outcome of the case because
the question put to the jury was the adequacy of the warning to the
physician. 138
In Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp.,139 the injured party electively
sought augmentation mammoplasty and two silicone gel-filled im131. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Because the
plaintiff did not bring a cause of action for negligent failure to warn, relying instead
on theories of strict liability and negligence, the court did not address the learned
intermediary defense. Id. However, law suits against physicians for injuries resulting
from breast implantation were reported as early as 1967. 2 MARDEN G. DIXON, DRUG
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.08[4] (1990).
132. 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983).
133. Id. at 648.
134. Id. at 648-49.
135. Id. at 656.
136. Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646, 650 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983).
137. Id.
138. Id. The case was remanded, however, because the issue of express warranty
was erroneously submitted to the jury. Id. at 656. Three theories of liability were
submitted to the jury. Because a general verdict was returned, the court was unable
to determine on what basis the jury found the defendant liable. Id.
139. 712 F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989).
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plants were implanted in her breasts.140 The implants were subsequently removed when each leaked silicone into the surrounding
tissue.' 4 ' Although the court cited Davis, an early exception based
on the absence of individualized balancing by a physician, it affirmed
the application of the learned intermediary doctrine and denied the
plaintiff a cause of action for failure to warn.14 2
The most recent breast implant case denying a plaintiff recovery
under the learned intermediary doctrine was Lee v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp. 143 Following two consultations with a plastic surgeon, the
plaintiff underwent breast augmentation surgery. 14 4 The implants
ruptured and leaked silicone into the surrounding tissue. Subsequently, palpable nodules formed in the plaintiff's breasts.145
Although her surgeon testified that he normally discussed possible
complications with his breast implant patients and supplied them
with an informational brochure published by the defendant, the
plaintiff alleged that she was not warned. Further, the plaintiff
claimed that had she been warned of possible complications, she
would not have proceeded with the surgery.14 6
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issues of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. 4 7 The principal issue on appeal was whether the
manufacturer owed a duty to directly warn the patient of the risks
associated with its breast implants.148 The court of appeals reaffirmed that the learned intermediary doctrine "has been applied to
devices, requiring the manufacturer to warn only the doctor."' 149 As
a manufacturer of medical devices, the defendant "had no duty to
warn the plaintiff directly of the risks associated with breast prosthesis."I50 Finding the manufacturer's warning to the physician legally
140. Id. at 13.
141. Id. at 13-14.
142. Id. at 17-18. Although the court barred the plaintiffs cause of action for failure to warn, it denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the adequacy of the warning to the physician, specifically whether it warned of
possible implant rupture, was a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 18.
The standards by which the courts have considered the adequacy of physician
warnings have become substantially more rigorous following disclosure of the information originally exposed in Stern proving that breast implant manufacturers had
prior knowledge of the dangers of implants. See supra note 6.
143. 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989).
144. Id. at 91.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 90.
148. Lee v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D. Md. 1989).
149. Id. at 95.
150. Id.
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adequate,151 the Lee court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant.1 52
Although these actions affirm the applicability of the learned intermediary doctrine to breast implant cases, the courts reached their
conclusions without plumbing the depths of analysis found in the
Odgers and MacDonald line of cases.1 5 3 Rather, the courts relied almost exclusively on the rationale that breast implants are not available except through the professional services of a physician. Had the
courts considered the factors leading to the vaccine, contraceptive,
and IUD exceptions, it is likely that breast implant actions, at least
those arising from nontherapeutic use, would be exempt from the
doctrine.
B.

Rationalefor a Breast Implant Exception

As the vaccine and contraceptive cases confirm, certain factual situations can establish the justification for exemption from the learned
intermediary doctrine. When comparing the circumstances of these
exemptions to the circumstances attending the use of breast implants, it becomes apparent that the courts were too hasty in their
blanket application of the doctrine to breast implant litigation.
First, most breast implant recipients decide to have implants prior
to consultation with a physician. Like the healthy consumers identified by the MacDonald court,154 more than 80% of the women who
receive breast implants do so for cosinetic, and not therapeutic reasons.' 5 5 Patient choice plays a "much more prominent role' 15 6 in
cases where women elect to have implants inserted for breast augmentation than in the case of patients who require drugs for treatment of illness or injury.'57 In the former case, the patient can make
a rational choice to forego breast augmentation. Thus, if she rejects
breast implants, the decision will not be life threatening.158 Given
the propensity for implants to rupture and the devastating effects silicone can wreak on the immune system, direct-to-patient information
is likely to prevent many women from opting for elective breast
151. "A warning is legally adequate when it explains the risk which the plaintiff
alleges has caused the injury." Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 95 (citing Weinberger v. BristolMyers Co., 652 F. Supp. 187, 191 (D. Md. 1986)).
152. Id. at 96.
153. See supra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
154. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985).
155. Teich v. Food & Drug Admin., 751 F. Supp. 243, 245-46 (D.D.C. 1990).
156. Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(quoting In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 884 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting)).
157. Id.
158. See Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
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augmentation. 159
Second, breast implants are inserted at one specific time but are
intended to be used for a long period of time without frequent, if
any, return visits to the implanting surgeon.
Unlike the patient who requires treatment for illness or injury,
breast implant recipients frequently have no ongoing relationship
with the implanting surgeon. Because of the "relatively high incidence of serious adverse effects" associated with breast implants and
the "long duration of use without medical evaluation," the recipient
may not have adequate "opportunity to explore her questions and
concerns . . .with the . . .physician."6o

Although breast implant

recipients may return to the care of general practitioners, nonsurgical physicians lack specialized knowledge about breast implants and
the symptoms of their adverse effects.
Third, the side effects associated with breast implants can more
readily be detected by the patient if she is informed of their nature
and symptoms and is instructed to return to her physician for professional evaluation. From its inception, the primary objective of the
learned intermediary doctrine was to avoid injury to the patient. 161
Given that breast implant surgeons are specialists who lack ongoing
relationships with their patients, it is unlikely that the surgeon is in
the best position to detect symptoms of potentially threatening side
effects. A patient who is fully informed of the risks of adverse reactions and their attendant symptoms is in a far better position to recognize an adverse reaction before it fully
decreasing the severity of potential injury.162

develops,

thereby

Fourth, breast implant patient information can easily be developed
in a manner that is understandable to the patient. The complexity of
the information a patient requires in order to make an informed
judgment regarding breast implant surgery and to recognize symptoms that may require medical assessment may be "too scanty"' 6 3 or
"insufficient"164 if left to oral communication by the physician.165
When written, this type of information is not only more understand159. See Lee v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Md. 1989).
160. Id.
161. See supra note 121.
162. 2 MARDEN G. DIXON, supra note 7, § 9.02[2], at 9-14.12. Mr. Dixon notes:
The average patient does not see a physician when the early danger signs
appear, because the significance of the danger is not recognized.... In many clinical
circumstances, the patient continues . . .until serious problems develop
which provide the incentive to return to a physician.... The time delay may
spell the difference between safety and catastrophe.
163. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 920 (1985).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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able to patients but also more readily available for future reference.
Moreover, breast implant manufacturers have voluntarily supplied
patients with direct information,166 demonstrating that the development and distribution of patient information is no longer "virtually
impossible" as the Cornish court noted so long ago.16 7 Finally, manufacturers promote breast implants to the public and specifically to
potential users. The court in Stephens found that the manufacturers
of oral conitraceptives had engaged in zealous marketing practices
and had targeted highly positive publicity directly to potential
users. 16 8 Such practices, the court noted, necessitated that comparable disclosure of the risks be made directly to the user. 169
Similarly, the breast implant industry has generated considerable
publicity, the majority of which is found in so-called "women's
magazines" that celebrate the virtues of large breasts and overpromote the simplicity and safety of breast augmentation surgery.' 70
If the dubious benefits of breast implants can so feasibly be provided
directly to patients, the risks can and should be similarly
communicated.
V.

THE NEXT LOGICAL INROAD: THE "ADVERTISING"

EXCEPTION

Despite FDA opposition, manufacturers are increasingly taking advantage of popular media to promote prescription drugs and devices
directly to the consumer public. 71 Notwithstanding the judiciary's
166. See, e.g., Lee v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Md. 1989).
167. Further support for the feasibility of direct-to-patient warnings stems from
dramatic changes in the pharmacy industry. Many drugs, and certainly breast implants, are dispensed in unit-of-use packages intended to be transmitted to or used in
the patient without repackaging by the pharmacist. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 n.7 (Mass.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
168. Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(quoting In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 884 (Mich. 1984)).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Nissa Simon, The Career Woman's Guide to Cosmetic Surgery and Other
Ways to Change Your Image, WORKING WOMAN, May 1988, at 127; NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11,
1988, at 58; Cheek It Out, PEOPLE, Aug. 24, 1987, at 45; Paule Dranov, Vanity Fair:
Plastic Surgery Can Give }our Body and Spirit a Needed Life, HEALTH, May 1987, at 65; New
Bodiesfor Sale, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1985, at 64; Changing an Image, NEWSWEEK, May 27,
1985, at 70.
171. See Alan R. Styles, Prescription Drugs, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 137-38 (1991).
For a comprehensive analysis of direct-to-consumer drug promotion, see Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned IntermediarT
Rule, 46 FooD DRUG Cosm. LJ. 829 (1991). The author identifies these examples of
advertising and media placement of press releases to promote: Seldane, an antihistamine, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 1991, at 13; Premarin, an estrogen therapy to prevent
osteoporosis, WOMAN'S DAY MAG., Apr. 2, 1991, at 75-76; Rogaine, a drug to encourage hair growth, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 54-56; Tagamet, an ulcer medication, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 24, 1991, at F3; N.E.E. 1/35, a birth control pill,
DRUG STORE NEws,June 18, 1990, at IP1; Estraderm, a estrogen replacement ther-
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obvious reluctance to further erode the learned intermediary doctrine, this direct-to-consumer advertising may prompt a reassessment of the doctrine's applicability. 172 The question the courts
should consider is whether manufacturers that promote health care
decision-making by consumers through direct advertising likewise
assume the duty to warn those consumers directly.173
Although several courts pondered the effect of consumer advertising,174 subsequent courts have given scant notice to the relationship

between direct advertising and the duty to warn. For example, de75
spite widespread consumer-directed promotion of Accutane,1
courts have consistently invoked the learned intermediary doctrine
to bar recovery for injuries resulting from Accutane use. 17 6 The
learned intermediary doctrine has similarly shielded manufacturers
of penile implants177 and collagen implants 178 that have actively proapy, LADIES' HOME J., Aug. 1991, at 54-56; Nicorette, a chewing gum to ease withdrawal from cigarette smoking, PEOPLE, Feb. 18, 1991, at 52; Hismanal, an allergy
medication, PARADE, July 28, 1991, at 6-8; Transderm Scop, a medicated patch to
prevent motion sickness, PEOPLE, Aug. 19, 1991, at 23-24; Actigall, a medication to
dissolve gallstones, LADIES' HOME J., June 1991, at 55-56; and Calan, a blood pressure lowering drug, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 9-10. Id. at 836.
172. Schwartz, supra note 171, at 835.
173. Id. at 838.
174.

See supra text accompanying note 100 and infra text accompanying notes 180-

81. See also Schwartz, supra note 171, at 841-42.
175. See, e.g., Skin Perfect, HEALTH, Sept. 1983, at 46; Matt Clark & David Grant,
Now a Real Cure for Acne, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 56. Accutane is Hoffman-La
Roche's brand name for isotretinoin, an acne control. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE
1960 (47th ed. 1993).
176. Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1992); Hunt v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1992); Bealer v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. La. 1990). In each case, the court found there was
no duty to warn the patient where the manufacturer gave adequate warning to the
physician.
177. Harwell v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)
(holding that inflatable penile prosthesis manufacturer satisfied its duty to warn by
providing adequate disclosure of potential adverse effects to plaintiffis physician);
Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that manufacturer of
inflatable penile implant had no duty to warn consumer where adequate warning was
provided to physician).
178. Ramey v. Collagen Corp., 821 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
manufacturer of collagen implant failed to provide patient's physician with adequate
warnings, however, the inadequate warnings were not the proximate cause of the
patient's injury). As the result of a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, plaintiffs injured by collagen implants will no longer be able to bring suit under state law
for negligence, fraud or faulty warnings. Jill Gambon, Court Axes Suits on FDA-Approved Medical Devices, BOSTON Bus. J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 3. The appeals court ruled that
state tort law is preempted by the Medical Devices Amendment (MDA), enacted in
1976, that gives the FDA authority to regulate medical devices. Id. See also supra note
2. In effect, the ruling strips consumers who are injured by FDA-approved medical
devices of legal recourse under state law. Although breast implants are devices fall-
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The only court that has thus far ventured to articulate the merits of
an advertising exception was a Massachusetts federal district court in
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc. 180 In dicta, the court suggested that "bypass[ing] the traditional patient-physician relationship" through direct-to-consumer advertising "may constitute a third exception to
the learned intermediary rule."181
Commentators support the advertising exception on grounds that
consumer-directed advertising undermines the rationales on which
the learned intermediary doctrine is premised. First, the fact that
manufacturers are advertising their drugs and devices to consumers
suggests that consumers are active participants in their health care
decisions, invalidating the concept that it is the doctor, not the patient, who decides whether a drug or device should be used.182 Second, it is illogical to argue that requiring manufacturers to provide
direct warnings to consumers will undermine the patient-physician
relationship'83 when, by its very nature, consumer-directed advertising encroaches on that relationship by encouraging consumers to ask
for advertised products by name. 184 Finally, consumer-directed advertising rebuts the notion that prescription drugs and devices and
their potential adverse effects are too complex to be effectively communicated to lay consumers.185 Because the FDA requires that prescription drug and device advertising carry warnings,18 6 the
consumer may reasonably presume that the advertiser guarantees
the adequacy of its warnings. Thus, the common law duty to warn
the ultimate consumer should apply.187
Although precedents set by the Stephens and Hill courts and the
more recent ruling in Garside appear to have set the stage for an advertising exception to the learned intermediary doctrine, it is relevant to note that courts have steadfastly ignored opportunities to
ing within the definition of the MDA, the ruling will not affect liability cases against
implant manufacturers because implants were marketed before the medical device
law was enacted. Id.
179. See, e.g., The Latest Wrinkle, PEOPLE, Aug. 24, 1987, at 45 (promoting injectable
collagen); Changing an Image, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1985, at 70 (promoting collagen
implants).
180. 764 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass. 1991).
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying note 112; Schwartz, supra note 171, at 842-43.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
184. Schwartz, supra note 171, at 843.
185. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text; Schwartz, supra note 171, at
843.
186. See James M. Johnstone, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: An IndustDy Perspective,
47 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 63 (1992).
187. Schwartz, supra note 171, at 845.
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expand exceptions to the rule.188 Despite compelling evidence to
the contrary, courts may fail to accept the premise that consumerdirected advertising has so altered the patient-physician relationship
that it warrants further erosion of the doctrine since the physician
ultimately authorizes the prescription, without which the patient has
no access to the desired drug or device.189
VI.

DIRECT MANUFACTURER-TO-PATIENT WARNINGS

Even if the courts were to recognize an advertising exception, the
learned intermediary doctrine, contrary as it is to both the modern
realities of medical practice and to contemporary public policy, is a
concept that has outlived its erstwhile value. Principal among its
shortcomings is the fact that the doctrine substantially overstates the
ability and willingness of the medical community to act as a learned
intermediary, contradicts the concept of informed consent and a patient's right to self-determination, and ignores the substantial benefits of an informed patientry.190
First, the volume and potential for overpromotion of drug information renders the physician an ineffective intermediary. Challenged by a constant bombardment of drug literature from
manufacturers, the physician frequently is unable to keep up with the
daily changes in the state of medical knowledge.19, The sheer volume of drug literature argues against the physician being informed
of all the hazards of all the drugs and devices he or she prescribes.
This is especially true when a drug's side effects are discovered only
after the physician has received and relied upon the drug manufacturer's initial marketing literature.
Direct-to-patient warnings, however, would not result in similar inundation. The patient, with no need or interest in knowing the potential hazards of a wide variety of medical products, would only be
concerned with the risks associated with the specific drug prescribed.
Another factor militating against the physician as learned intermediary stems from a phenomenon generally referred to as "overpromotion."1 92 Physicians who initially received adequate warnings
188. See supra parts III.D., IV.A.
189. Schwartz, supra note 171, at 839-40. Schwartz noted that prescription drug
and device advertising is unique in that it directs consumers to visit their physicians
and emphasizes that it is the physician who is responsible for informing patients of
the risks and benefits of the product and who ultimately determines whether a prescription should be given. Id.
190. See generally Gilhooley, supra note 24.
191. Manufacturers provide physicians with product information through package
inserts, advertisements in the Physician's Desk Reference, advertising in medical journals, direct letters, personal contact at professional meetings, and through their direct sales force. See 2 MARDEN G. DIXON, supra note 7, § 3.05, at 3-16.
192. Courts have recognized that, even when an adequate warning is originally
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may become so influenced by the manufacturer's advertising that
they disregard the warnings. Overpromotion is unlikely to affect direct-to-patient warnings since ethical drug manufacturers rarely advertise their products directly to the public.
Second, the learned intermediary doctrine is based on medical paternalism that is inconsistent with the concept of informed consent.
The single most important argument in favor of direct-to-patient
warnings is the notion of informed consent.19 3 Although early informed consent actions occurred where the physician exceeded the
scope of the patient's consent, the situation as it now arises involves
the physician's duty to advise the patient of the risks inherent in a
particular course of treatment.194
The extent to which the patient is entitled to knowledge of the
risks attending a prescribed treatment has been a source of dispute
in the courts. Under the traditional customary-practice standard, the
scope of the duty to warn is determined by the standard of practice
in the community.' 9 5 At best, this standard affords the patient only a
limited knowledge of the risks associated with her treatment; at
worst, it affords none at all.
The other view is represented by the reasonable-patient standard
articulated in Canterbury v. Spence. 19 6 The Canterbury court found that
the standard of review is not the standard set by custom of physicians
practicing in the community; 197 rather "[r]espect for the patient's
right of self-determination . . . demands a standard set by law for

physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose
upon themselves." 198

Although controversy over the right of disclosure is understandable in the context of surgery and alternative methods of treatment,
the same cannot be said of the disclosure of risks associated with
prescription drugs and devices. With regard to the former, there is
supplied by the manufacturer, the warning is invalidated by subsequent advertising
and promotions that downplay the risks of the drug or encourage its application to
ailments for which the drug is inappropriate. See, e.g., Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that advertising extolling minimal side effects nullified
prior warnings of risks).
193. The theory of "informed consent" was first articulated by justice Cardozo in
1914: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). See also
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
194. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 19, at 189-92.
195. See Buckner v. Allergan Pharm., Inc., 400 So. 2d 820, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
196. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
197. Id. at 784.
198. Id.
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no third party who is qualified to make disclosure. Only the physician can do so. But in the case of drugs and devices, both the physician and the manufacturer are qualified to disclose material
information regarding risks and adverse effects. By imposing on
manufacturers the dutyto inform patients directly, the patient would
be assured of full disclosure without being needlessly subjected to
the physician's or the courts' discretion.
Third, an informed patientry is more likely to satisfy the initial
goal of the learned intermediary doctrine: preventing avoidable patient injury. Patients who are fully informed of the potential risks
associated with a prescribed drug or treatment are better able to recognize the symptoms of adverse reactions before they fully develop.19 9 Short of round-the-clock surveillance, it is unlikely that a
physician will be present when initial symptoms manifest. The patient, therefore, is more likely to be the initial observer of the symptoms of adverse reactions to drugs and therapies. Without adequate
warnings, the patient will not know how to interpret what may appear to be seemingly innocuous symptoms. 200
Similarly, direct-to-patient warnings may increase compliance with
the proper and safe use of drugs and devices.201 The FDA has reported that patients' noncompliance with proper drug use is a principal cause for therapeutic failure.202
Direct-to-patient warnings have distinct advantages over the same
information being supplied by the physician. A warning from the
manufacturer would, by necessity, be in writing, while the physician's
warnings frequently are verbal. Written information has the advantage of serving as a future reference, permitting further study by the
patient and availability when the patient has a specific question or
concern. 20 3
For these reasons and for the reasons espoused in MacDonald and
its progeny, it is time for revitalization of the common law duty to
warn the consumer directly. Because a common law duty to warn
might engender confusing inconsistency among jurisdictions, patient
warnings ought to be administratively regulated to ensure standardized patient information that is easy to understand.204
Where a warning can readily be conveyed in a lay person's language, a drug manufacturer's failure to warn the consumer directly
should result in liability for any injuries to the consumer proximately
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See Gilhooley, supra note 24, at 672.
Id.
Id. at 673.
44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,021 (1979).
Gilhooley, supra note 24, at 673 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 60,760 (1980)).
Styles, supra note 171, at 139.
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caused by use of the drug or device. 2 05 But where potential adverse
effects cannot easily be communicated, the physician should also
have the duty to warn the patient. 2 06 In rare instances where the
manufacturer cannot communicate the necessary information directly to the consumer in a manner that adequately minimizes risk,
the regulations should allow the physician discretion in determining
whether the manufacturer's information should be withheld.207
VII.

CONCLUSION

The learned intermediary doctrine, gradually eroded since it was
first articulated, has now outlived its usefulness. In the future, courts
should not so readily adopt the rationale of the "learned intermediary." Instead, courts should scrutinize its underlying premise, taking
into account the developments in the doctrine of informed consent,
the substantial benefits of an informed patientry, and the feasibility
of reasonable methods for compliance with the imposition of a duty
to warn the consumer. The logical conclusion of this more reasoned
judicial scrutiny is that the time has come to put the learned intermediary defense to rest.
205. Id. at 138-39 (quoting Barbara P. Flannagan, Products Liability: The Continued
Viability of the Learned Intermediary Rule as It Applies to Product Warnings for Prescription
Drugs, 20 U. RicH. L. REV. 405, 423 (1986)).
206. Id. at 139.
207. Id.
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